INTRODUCTION
The early stages of a new industry are often uncertain and convoluted, as firms explore potential options. As a result, firms that commercialize the same dominant design often follow different paths to reach that point. Firms may transition not just from the old technology to the new (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) , but also from one uncertain and speculative variant to another as they receive feedback about the efficacy of their choices. We know relatively little about the long-term implications of technological choices made during the transition process, but building blocks are available from prior work on how inertia (e.g., Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) and Keywords: competing Copyright  2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. complementary assets (e.g., Tripsas, 1997) impede or facilitate the transition from the old to the new technology.
For industries that begin with competing technological options, managers effectively have four options-support one technology or the other or both, or delay until uncertainty is resolved (Kretschmer, 2008) . These choices may have path dependent implications for long-term performance. On one hand, firms initially focusing on the technology that later loses the competition are likely to face internal resistance to switching to the winning technology (Eggers, 2012) . On the other hand, firms making early investments in the subsequent winning technology may do so too early and find themselves unable to commercialize the best generation of the technology (Bohlmann, Golder, and Mitra, 2002) . Firms placing early bets on both technologies might suffer the challenges facing one or both types of focused firms. Finally, firms that wait until the technological competition has been settled may avoid making inefficient investments but will not build important knowledge until after earlier investors, putting them at a disadvantage (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) . These four statements suggest that precommercialization choices have significant implications for firm performance.
These idiosyncratic paths to commercialization are a form of pre-entry experience (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Klepper and Simons, 2000; Sosa, 2013) , as experience is accumulated before commercialization (entry) and affects firm-level heterogeneity in assets, capabilities, and knowledge. Unlike recently studied types of pre-entry experience, experience derived from early technological choices is not translated from a different industry or submarket (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2007; Mitchell, 1989) , but is directly related to the focal market and strategic choices made by managers after the decision to pursue a new opportunity. As a result, firms may look similar at the moment of commercialization (in terms of entry timing and previous industry experience), but may actually possess fundamentally different underlying competences and resources. The difficulty in navigating the uncertainty of an emerging new technological space before the establishment of the dominant design is an important subject, but the effect of precommercialization choices is an understudied aspect of competitive heterogeneity.
This study investigates the impact of precommercialization technological choices on subsequent firm performance, focusing on the extent to which these choices affect the ability to translate technical knowledge into highly valued products. Using data from the inception of the global flat panel display industry and tracking the evolution of two competing technologies-liquid crystal (LCD) and plasma-from the 1960s through the 2000s, this study investigates the product performance implications of early knowledge creation investments in the losing technology (plasma) before commercializing the winning technology (LCD). The results offer two interesting findings. First, firms with greater precommercialization investment in plasma perform better in LCD than firms that supported LCD from the beginning. Early LCD supporters were able to develop knowledge about the underlying technology, but made a series of inefficient and difficult-to-reverse investments in early LCD generations that did not become the dominant design, and their reluctance to abandon these investments hindered their ability to move effectively to the dominant design. Second, firms that made significant early plasma investments perform better in LCD than firms that began investing in LCDs after the resolution of uncertainty, most likely due to knowledge about market demands and expectations accumulated from their early activities. Thus, in flat panel displays, the data suggest that making a mistake (e.g., the precommercialization choice to invest in plasma) was a beneficial path.
This study makes three primary contributions. First, the stylized fact of the superior performance of firms switching from plasma to LCD in this instance serves as an 'existence proof' that firms making the wrong technological choice initially can actually succeed in an emerging industry. This perspective extends existing work on the importance of technological choices and organizational flexibility in the face of technological uncertainty (Bayus and Agarwal, 2007; Tegarden, Hatfield, and Echols, 1999) and emphasizes that organizational adaptation is not just about switching from the old technology to the new, but also about how firms navigate uncertain technological transitions. In doing so, this study adds an important facet to our understanding of competing technologies in new industries, where existing research has largely focused on which technology wins (Arthur, 1989; Schilling, 1998) and not on the firm-level implications of technological choices.
Second, I offer two theoretical mechanisms that jointly explain the observed empirical outcome. These mechanisms, rooted in the 'window of opportunity' model (Christensen, Suárez, and Utterback, 1998) , have broader implications beyond the context of this study. One involves the accumulation of knowledge applicable across technological platforms based on experience with any technology in the industry. As the knowledge is not tied to one specific technology, it is likely to be market knowledge about consumer preferences (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000) that is related to Sosa's (2009) application-specific knowledge. The other mechanism involves inertia resulting from too early commitments to the eventual winning technological option. Significant technological investments typically result in routines and processes that can be the source of inertia if the commitments turn out to be suboptimal (Gilbert, 2005; Leonard-Barton, 1992) .
Third, this study complements and extends earlier work on technological competition (Eggers, 2012) . Jointly, these works offer a more complete view of the fate of firms making the wrong technological choices in a competing technology situation. The earlier study (Eggers, 2012) focuses on behavioral implications of the negative feedback these firms receive and indicates that failed investments discourage firms from switching to the dominant design. The current study suggests that those few firms that do switch may actually be able to benefit from their failed prior experience under the right set of circumstances, based on the timing of technological evolution and organizational reorientation. These switchers bring market knowledge that late entrants lack and bring the most recent generation of the dominant technology to market. Meanwhile, firms that backed the winning technology from the start may make investments too early, limiting their flexibility as the technology evolves. Jointly, these two studies present a detailed picture of the complex dynamics affecting organizational choices in the context of competing and uncertain technological options.
From a managerial perspective, it is important to note that the implication from the surprising performance of switchers isn't that managers should intentionally support the wrong technology. As will be addressed in the Discussion section, identifying the wrong technology is as difficult as identifying the right one, and failed investments are subject to behavioral biases that make managing the transition difficult (Guler, 2007) . The real implication for uncertain technological environments is that managers initially backing the wrong technology should consider switching technologies as opposed to abandoning the industry completely, and they should think about what knowledge generated in the losing technology might be useful for future projects.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In their study on the evolution of the hard disk drive industry, Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback (1998) offer a 'window of opportunity' model. Firms entering an industry too late are slow to develop important resources that affect performance, but firms that enter too early (before the emergence of the dominant design) suffer because their skills and capabilities will not be appropriate for the emerging dominant design.
1 As articulated in the following subsections, this study builds off that model by focusing on each aspect individually. The first subsection outlines why and how investing in an early variant of the winning technology may be more detrimental to firm performance than investing initially in the losing technology. The second subsection discusses why early investment in any technology may be preferable to waiting until uncertainty subsides, as late investment limits the firm's ability to accrue and assimilate knowledge. The net effect of these two forces is that firms making investments early but focusing on the losing technology may exhibit the best subsequent performance.
Precommercialization choices: winning versus losing technologies
Firms that begin knowledge-creation investments in a newly created industry too early may suffer disadvantages based on their technological commitments. Later generations of a technology may be more efficient than earlier ones, providing an advantage to followers that focus on the later generation (Bayus and Agarwal, 2007) . When technologies develop rapidly (decreasing costs and/or increasing quality), the result is a 'technology vintage effect' (Bohlmann et al., 2002) where early generations underperform later ones. If firms struggle to move between generations, performance may decline. As stated by Christensen et al. (1998) , 'capabilities and knowledge gained at earlier stages in an industry's development might not be useful-in fact might even become liabilities' (Christensen et al., 1998: S213) and 'the capabilities and cultures they [firms] developed in the competitive environment might not have equipped them well for the competition that characterized the industry after the dominant design emerged' (Christensen et al., 1998: S208) . This does not suggest that firms lack the required technical knowledge, but that they may struggle to translate that knowledge into high quality new products through effective new product development and manufacturing processes. It is more efficient to accumulate new knowledge based on existing knowledge the firm has (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) , and the ability of the firm to move along the technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982) within its research 162
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and knowledge creation should remain strong. But processes, resources, and routines that the firm develops around that early knowledge are more likely to be sources of inertia (Gilbert, 2005; Nelson and Winter, 1982) . The routines and processes the firm possesses were optimized for the old generation, but not for the new one. This is akin to the logic used by Henderson and Clark (1990) in discussing architectural innovation and builds off the idea of competency traps (LeonardBarton, 1992) . Attempts to make small changes to design and manufacturing processes continually produce inferior outcomes both for the old and the new generation of the technology. Simultaneously, managers recognize they have been 'right' in their earlier technological bets and want to justify their investments, which reduces incentives to make wholesale changes in technological operations. This perception of prior success without the understanding of the differences between old and new technological generations creates inertia that restricts switching (Miller, 1994) . Thus, the very factors that made the company successful become liabilities, and firms may be inefficient in adapting to the dominant design. If inertial forces limit switching from an early variant of the winning technology to the dominant design, why would switching from the losing technology be different? The answer is that managers and engineers perceive a difference because it is the losing technology. Firms that initially supported the eventual losing technology have the challenge of recognizing the failure of their technological choice and discontinuing investment (Guler, 2007) , as well as the challenge of building knowledge in the winning technology (Eggers, 2012) . However, if they are able to transition to the dominant design, the differences between their initial investments and the new technology may convince them to 'scrap and start over,' as one industry insider in my empirical context stated. This allows firms making the transition from the losing technology to the winning one to enter directly into the dominant design, avoiding investments in knowledge, processes, and structures particular to the pre-dominant design environment. These firms were already making dramatic changes to switch from the losing to the winning technology, and coordinating significant changes is more effective than continual tinkering (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994) . Thus, while the transition from the losing technology to the dominant design may be difficult to initiate within the organization, once the firm is committed to the transition, it is likely to be more effective because of its lack of reliance on its previous knowledge.
These perspectives concern the timing of technological commitment. The question is not when the firm makes its first investment in a technology (as this may be exploratory) or when the firm brings a technology to market (as commitments are made before this), but when difficult-to-reverse commitments in a specific technology are made. In this study, I propose that the timing of the firm's technological commitments is likely to be a function of the timing and the volume of the firm's knowledge-creation investments in that technology. Firms that patented in the winning technology before the emergence of the dominant design made investments in a configuration that wasn't the dominant design, and firms making larger investments have created more structures, processes, and capabilities that are likely to be a source of inertia later. Therefore, I suggest that, based on the logic of technological commitment and the inertial effects of investing too early, early patenting in the losing technology is more advantageous for subsequent firm performance than early investment in the winning technology.
Hypothesis 1 (H1):
Greater precommercialization patenting in the losing technology will be more positively related to subsequent firm performance in the winning technology than precommercialization patenting in the winning technology.
Precommercialization choices: early versus late investment
While some technological knowledge and processes will be generation specific (as discussed earlier), some knowledge is likely to be useful across generations and technologies. Firms with early investments may accumulate useful market knowledge during their technological exploration process (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000) . Most useful would be knowledge about the needs and wants of customers (Slater and Narver, 1998) . Knowledge gained from product configuration experimentation would build architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and identify the criteria that drive consumer acceptance. In addition, some aspects of manufacturing are likely to be identical, and the relationships that firms have made with potential suppliers and complementors may be useful across technological solutions. The key is that firms entering the new opportunity space accumulate these resources and knowledge as they begin to make investments, irrespective of the technology in which the investments are made. Instead of being technology specific, such knowledge and resources are what Sosa (2009) calls 'application specific' and are available only based on experience in the application domain.
By contrast, firms that wait until uncertainty is resolved and the dominant design has been crowned may be able to avoid inefficient decisions and reduce their risk, but will lack experiencedriven resources and knowledge that can affect performance. As many of these resources are built over time and subject to learning curves (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) , later investors may struggle to catch up with earlier movers. Additionally, without the knowledge gained through early experimentation and basic research, later movers may find themselves unable to identify and assimilate useful information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) . Thus, I argue that firms with greater precommercialization patenting in the losing technology should see more positive performance in the winning technology than firms that wait out the initial uncertainty to enter with the winning technology, but who lack complementary knowledge and assets.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Precommercialization patenting in the losing technology will be more positively related to subsequent firm performance in the winning technology than late initiation of patenting in either technology.
Both H1 and H2 are stated in terms of firms switching from the losing to the winning technological platform. The mechanism behind each hypothesis, however, would affect other types of firms. In the case of H1, the argument is that later technological commitment is preferable to earlier (specifically pre-dominant design) commitment. This mechanism would produce benefits both for switching firms and for those that began patenting after the dominant design emerged. In the case of H2, the argument is that early knowledge generation in any technology is better than late knowledge generation. This mechanism would produce benefits for all three types of early patenters-those starting in the winning technology, those starting in the losing technology, or both. While this could be seen as producing competing predictions, each hypothesis works on a different mechanism. This means that the hypotheses may be additive, and the combined effects give a theoretical rank ordering of firms. If both effects exist, then precommercialization patenting in the losing technology should be the biggest driver of success (gaining benefits from both H1 and H2). In addition, if the late technological commitment effect (H1) is bigger than the early knowledge effect (H2), then later investors (who gain only in H1) should perform better than early supporters of the winning technology (who gain only in H2). This ordering will be investigated empirically later in the article.
INDUSTRY HISTORY AND RESEARCH SETTING
This article investigates the performance implications of precommercialization knowledge-creation investments in the global flat panel display industry. According to DisplaySearch (2007) , the 2006 flat panel display industry (panels only, not finished products) was around $85.5 billion worldwide, up 14 percent from 2004. As of 2006, Korean manufacturers LG Electronics and Samsung were the two leading branded suppliers, while Taiwanese companies AU Optoelectronics and Chi Mei Optronics were the leading OEM providers. The history of the industry, however, includes names like IBM, Sony, Philips, and Mitsubishi as major players. To understand the empirical context, I conducted more than 20 interviews (about 90 minutes each) with 25 individuals with direct experience and indirect knowledge (via friends, colleagues, reputation) of more than 30 firms. Interviewees were generally either R&D employees (scientists) or R&D managers (middle and executive level). These interviews were supplemented with extensive research through published reports and industry histories, especially Murtha, Lenway, and Hart (2001) . Qualitative data (to be introduced later) come from these sources.
In the 1960s, research at several universities indicated the possibility of creating large flat panel screens to replace cathode ray tube (CRT) televisions and monitors. In this early stage of the industry's development (1966 through the early 1980s), there were a number of competing technologies, most notably liquid crystal (LCD) and gas plasma displays. Firms pursuing flat panel display technologies generally were incumbents in the CRT monitor industry or the semiconductor industry (which have important technical and manufacturing similarities). Some firms focused on LCD (led by Canon, Seiko-Epson, Sharp, Toshiba, Xerox, and General Electric) and some focused on plasma (led by IBM, Sony, NEC, Philips, and Fujitsu), while some invested in both (namely Hitachi, Matsushita, Texas Instruments, and Siemens). In the early 1980s, a number of events created a path for LCD's dominance over plasma (despite plasma's reemergence in the late 1990s as a viable option for large format televisions) and shaped the continued evolution of LCD toward the emerging dominant design configuration.
2 First, it became clear that consumers would value color screens over monochrome. It was difficult to make color plasma displays with acceptable resolution since color required three cells for each pixel (one for each primary color). A scientist that I spoke with said that they 'knew there was a road to color [for plasma displays], but it was going to be difficult.' Second, Seiko-Epson came to the 1983 Society for Information Display (SID) conference with the first full-color LCD screen, a 2-inch thin-film-transistor (TFT) design (Morozumi 2 Plasma currently occupies a place in the market for televisions, but a few caveats are necessary. First and most important for this research, plasma effectively 'died' as a viable technology in the mid-1980s and wasn't revived until the early 1990s. Practically every firm with early research in plasma abandoned that research in the 1980s (Fujitsu was the one exception), and firms entering plasma in the 1990s had to buy their way in. Matsushita, for example, was an early proponent of plasma but purchased a small start-up (Plasmaco) in the early 1990s that had helped revolutionize plasma television technology. Thus, we can look at the resurgence of plasma in the late 1990s and 2000s as a separate event from the early interest in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, plasma has been successful only in the largest screen sizes and only in televisions, resulting in a less than 5 percent market share in the large format displays even at plasma's peak. Third, most plasma makers (including early leaders like Fujitsu and Pioneer) had abandoned their plasma operations by 2009. The continued growth in LCD share-combined with improvements in color for LCDs based on LED backlit technologies that largely erase plasma's advantages in picture quality-has led most firms to conclude that plasma's days as a viable technology are numbered. These factors-along with confirming statements from many manufacturers-let me safely categorize LCD as the winning technology in the 1980s and plasma as the loser. et al., 1983), which was introduced commercially 15 months later as the ET-10 Pocket TV. Sources described this demonstration as an 'eye-opening' experience. The crowds at Seiko-Epson's booth and the discussions among conference attendees spurred R&D managers from firms that already had LCD investments to ask senior management for additional funding and led managers from firms pursuing plasma to question their choice and consider reorienting around LCD technology. For example, one scientist at a firm that had been supporting plasma related that, 'I went and made a pitch . . . [T] his could really be the key to the future of flat panels. And [this company] needs to start paying attention. And what you should do is give me some money to start a [LCD] program.' The result was that more than 20 companies exhibited active-matrix LCD screens at SID events from 1984 to 1991 (Howard, 1992) . The third major technical breakthrough started in 1979 with the suggestion that amorphous silicon could replace polysilicon as the addressing method for LCDs (Le Comber, Spear, and Ghaith, 1979) . The advantages of amorphous silicon were that it could be handled at much lower temperatures and was less damaged by small imperfections, thus greatly reducing cost. At the same 1983 SID meeting as Seiko-Epson's presentation, Toshiba demonstrated an amorphous silicon LCD panel (Suzuki et al., 1983) . Thus, the evolution of the industry moved away not just from plasma, but also from the dominant forms of early LCD technology-twisted-nematic (TN) and super-twisted-nematic (STN) displays. The winning LCD configuration was full-color active matrix TFT displays, which emerged commercially in 1987 and dominated by the early 1990s.
The growing interest in LCD technology can also be seen from patent records shown in Figure 1 (the inset shows only the uncertain 1966 to 1982 period, with a rescaled y-axis for easier viewing). During the period 1983 to 1992, the aggregate patenting in LCD quickly passed that in plasma. A large number of firms-including Samsung, Hyundai, and the current Taiwanese leaders-began their first knowledge-creation investments in the industry after 1983. Despite these innovations in 1983, the first mass-produced LCD products did not appear on the consumer market until 1987. Early large-format (11-inch + screen) LCD products were entirely for This study focuses on display firms that made early, precommercialization investments in speculative flat panel technologies before eventually switching to TFT LCD. Some firms, therefore, moved from TN or STN LCD (both are technically very similar) to TFT LCD, some moved from plasma to TFT LCD, and some invested in both early LCD (TN or STN) and plasma before moving to TFT LCD. While most prior studies on technological evolution would focus on the transition from CRT to TFT LCD, this study is instead interested in the transition from STN LCD or plasma to TFT LCD, with the difficulties driven by the underlying uncertainty in the emergence of STN, TN, plasma, and TFT formats. Most of these early investing firms were incumbents in closely related industries-CRT displays and semiconductors-and, thus, the comparisons between these different transitions can be seen as studying incumbent responses to technological discontinuities (Eggers and Kaplan, 2009; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Sosa, 2009 ). Some of the later investors (those that entered directly into TFT LCD) were de novo entrants, but most had at least some experience in CRTs or semiconductors. And as the focus of this study is this transition between different types of emerging and speculative technologies, the real focus is on the behavior of large, multidivisional incumbent firms.
There are two samples of display firms in this article. The first sample, used to address selectionrelated issues, includes the 1,140 for-profit firms with at least two flat panel display patents (in any technology) from 1966 to 2005, as identified in the Derwent Innovations Index. The second sample, which is the main sample, includes the 55 firms with at least one expert-reviewed (see below) large-format LCD panel (694 products in total) marketed from 1987 to 2005. This set covers all firms globally where I could verifiably identify the manufacturer of the panel itself (not the brand on the product).
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VARIABLES AND ANALYSIS
Dependent variable
As the theory I have offered suggests that the trade-offs between industry knowledge and technological commitment will largely affect the firm's ability to translate technical knowledge into products, I focus on a measure of performance that is closely related to the development of new products-product value (or quality). Product value and quality are commonly used measures in the product development literature to evaluate the success or failure of research and development processes (Harter, Krishnan, and Slaughter, 2000) and, thus, are appropriate for an investigation of the impact of precommercialization knowledge-creation investments.
The specific variable is a measure of productlevel outcomes based on independent expert ratings of three categories of LCD products (televisions, monitors, and laptop screens) from 1987 to 2005. The variable is based on product ratings from Consumer Reports, CNet.com, PC World , PC Week , Government Computing News, and LCDTVBuyingGuide.com. Data of this type has been used previously in other studies investigating firm-level innovative performance (Novak and Stern, 2008) . As each source uses its own scale, I normalize each rating so the final variable is the number of standard deviations above or below the mean for that source.
5 While every source's exact criteria is unique, the following excerpt from PC World is indicative of the overall criteria used: 'The PC World Rating is the overall rating for a product, and results from the combined scores of four major component characteristics: features/ specifications, performance, design/usability, and of LCD panels and sourced the panels they installed in their products from a large number of suppliers. Each of these manufacturers had a single supplier for a portion of their history, but in many cases, these products cannot reliably be assigned to a specific panel manufacturer. In those cases, I include the reported product value ratings for those products in the process of normalizing the overall ratings, but exclude them from the regression analyses. This exclusion does not omit firms from my sample, as all of the suppliers to these three branded firms are in my sample with other products. 5 In cases where I have multiple ratings on the same product, I averaged the ratings to ensure only one rating per product. As there are very few instances of this, there is no way to test interrater reliability.
price ' (McLeod, 2005: 96) .
6 Thus, the ratings are not intended to capture such strategic decisions as high quality/high cost versus low quality/low cost, but are meant to be comparable across market segments as measures of product 'value.' 7 While I use ratings for the screen for laptops, I use composite ratings for monitors and televisions. This introduces noise in that a portion of the ratings may be based on on-screen displays, connections, controls, etc., but the LCD panel remains the primary component and, thus, is likely to be most important. Also, features such as remote controls and software tend to be consistent for any given manufacturer, so the random effects (discussed later) will address some of these secondary features.
Independent variables
Independent variables are derived from patent records from the Derwent Innovation Index. Derwent provides two advantages over USPTO data. First, Derwent provides data from numerous countries (including USPTO), appropriate for the global nature of this industry. This does not lead to double counting, as Derwent groups identical patents filed in multiple jurisdictions into a single 'patented innovation record.' For simplicity, I will continue to refer to these as 'patents' instead of patented innovation records. Second, a primary value add of Derwent is finer-grained categorization of patents than provided by the USPTO. This allows me to distinguish between patents for different flat panel technologies. To test the hypotheses, I need a measure of the technological choices made by firms during the early, uncertain period in the industry's development (roughly before 1983). I measure this with a count of early (pre-1983) 
Selection bias, firm quality, and instruments
The primary empirical challenge is selection bias. The central concern is that the process of switching from plasma (after having sunk significant resources into that technology) to LCD is difficult, and so the resulting sample of firms that initially supported plasma will be comprised largely of high quality firms that will in turn produce the best products. Stylistically, we can assume there are two types of flat panel display firms-high type and low type. We also assume that we segment the industry based on firms that faced low selection pressures (e.g., firms that always supported LCD) and firms that faced stringent selection (e.g., those that switched from plasma to LCD). Because of these different selection pressures, the first group is likely to have both high-and low-type firms in the manufacturing sample, while the second group is likely to have the remaining firms that began patenting later in the industry's evolution. Second, moving the cutoff point for early patent investments past 1989 presents a problem for the count of plasma patents, as this marks the period where plasma technology reemerges as a viable alternative for the small niche of largeformat televisions. Considering as similar plasma patents from 1979 (when there was a great deal of technological uncertainty in the market) and 1989 (when firms had a more realistic view of the future of plasma technology) does not make logical sense and clouds the interpretation of the results. It is also worth noting that the plasma versus LCD investment pattern of all early patenters in the 1983 to 1988 window is the same-firms are generally all focused on LCD technology during that time. The real heterogeneity in early, precommercialization technological choices truly takes place before 1983.
only high-type firms. I use two approaches-an instrumental two-stage Heckman approach and a less traditional direct measure of firm quality. These are discussed below.
Heckman first stage
Using the sample of 1,140 for-profit firms with at least two flat panel patents, I predict the likelihood of appearing in the product sample (55 firms) based on most of the variables used in the second stage (some variables are product or time varying and so are excluded from the first stage 
Firm quality
Second, I create a direct proxy for firm quality through a hazard rate model that predicts the likelihood that the firm would exit the technological space (cease all patenting in any flat panel display technology). The logic is that any firm whose patenting history is more likely to lead to exit but is still in the industry is likely to be a high-type firm. Specifically, I create a Cox proportional hazard model with clustered standard errors predicting the firm's duration in the flat panel industry (from the firm's first patent to the last). The model structure is similar to other industry evolution studies (e.g., Franco et al., 2009 Table A2 ) shows results that align with research on shakeouts-firms investing in the losing technology are most likely to exit. Greater plasma investment increases the hazard of exit across the pre-1983 (p < 0.001 ) and 1983 to 1992 (p < 0.01 ) periods. Overall, the results suggest that firms initially supporting plasma faced a more stringent selection environment than those that supported LCD. I use the predicted hazard rate from this model to create a firm-year cumulative hazard based on the firm's patenting history-a measure of the cumulative selection pressures the firm has faced (CUMUL EXIT HAZARD). I expect this control to be positively related to product value.
Other controls, analysis procedure, and descriptive statistics
The remaining controls are selected for their expected relation to product value. First, the independent variables discussed earlier track the firms' patenting activity in flat panel displays only pre-1983, but many firms did not commercialize until the 1990s. I track LCD patenting from 1983 to commercial entry (LCD PATENTS, 1983 to ENTRY). Second, PRODUCT ENTRY ORDER denotes the order in which the firms commercially introduced their first LCD product by category (laptop screen, desktop display, and television). The data are drawn from company timelines and press releases. This variable is the traditional measure of 'market entry order' used in first-mover advantage studies. Third, I include a dummy noting whether the firm had pre-entry experience in televisions or computers (TV/COMPUTER EXPERIENCE), as such experience is linked to performance (Klepper and Simons, 2000) . For computer products (laptops or monitors), the dummy takes on a value of '1' if the firm had experience in computers before introducing a flat panel computer product and '0' otherwise. The variable for television products is constructed similarly. Fourth, I include firm size in t-1 (FIRM SALES, log transformed). Data are drawn from Compustat, Moody's Review , and company press releases. Fifth, I include dummies noting corporate region of origin (JAPAN and US/EU, with the omitted category being from other parts of the world, primarily Korea, China, and Taiwan). Finally, since all regressions focus on the panel manufacturer and not the brand of the panel, I note whether a firm other than the panel maker marketed the product (OEM DUMMY). The primary sample comprises 694 products from 55 firms. The data are organized at the product level, so there are products nested within firms across 19 years. With multiple observations for each firm I use a multilevel hierarchical model with random firm effects (XTMIXED in Stata). I also allow for the firm-level random effect to vary depending on product category (television, monitor, and laptop screen) by including the category dummies in the random effects portion of the model (though omitting this does not change the core results).
To better understand the sample and my measures of precommercialization technological choices, Table 1 provides comparative descriptive statistics. In the columns, the data are broken into four categories-firms that had 75 percent or more of their pre-1983 flat panel patents in LCD (Column 1) or plasma (Column 2), firms that had at least 25 percent of their early flat panel patents in each technology (Column 3), and those firms that had no flat panel patents before 1983 (Column 4). These descriptive data are offered for two reasons. First, they indicate that firms differed greatly in their pre-1983 patenting investment and yet all three early investors (the first three PATENTS 1983-to-ENTRY and SALES) show slightly higher values for plasma-supporting firms, but the differences are not statistically significant. My empirical models control for these two variables. The only significant difference is in location, with most of the LCD firms being Japanese and most of the plasma firms being from the U.S., Europe, and Korea. In general, however, the descriptive data suggest that the two groups of firms are relatively similar, which reinforces the idea that the only real differences between groups are their technological choices. Correlations are included in Table 2 . The correlations show some particularly high values, and these fall into two groups. First, there is strong intercorrelation between LATE PATENTER and the measures of pre-1983 patenting. This is not surprising, as firms initiating patenting late will have zeroes for the pre-1983 patents and firms that patent early are likely to have multiple patents. Second, three control variables-FIRM SALES, JAPAN, and INVERSE MILLS RATIO-are all correlated with these measures of pre-entry technological choice. The simplest solution is to test models excluding different variables to check robustness. I exclude most checks for the sake of brevity, though they are discussed in the Robustness checks subsection. The exception is the selection bias control, which suggests that the first-stage model may be underidentified. As a result, I will show models both with and without this control. Model robustness to concerns of multicolinearity is discussed later.
RESULTS
The results are shown in Table 3 . Hypothesis 1 stated that precommercialization investment in plasma would be more beneficial than precommercialization investment in LCD, as earlier technological commitment would be disadvantageous. Across Models 1 to 5, the coefficient on PRE-1983 LCD PATENTS is negative and significant (p < 0.05 ) and the coefficient on PRE-1983 PLASMA PATENTS is positive and significant (p < 0.05 to p < 0.01 ). There is a statistically significant difference between the two coefficients (p < 0.001 in each model). These results show strong support for H1 and demonstrate that for a given level of pre-1983 patenting, firms 170 J. P. Eggers Table 2 . Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix M e a n S . D . allocating more of those patents to the losing technology (plasma) outperform those allocating their investment to the winning technology (LCD). Additionally, the extent of this difference increases as the volume of pre-1983 patenting increases. To provide some context, the time from 1979 to 1983 (which led to the dominance of LCD) saw significant changes in the dominant type of LCD design, namely moving from polysilicon to amorphous silicon as an addressing agent, moving from monochrome to color, and, at an architectural level, moving from STN to TFT. Early LCD pioneers such as Sharp, Seiko-Epson, and Canon made significant early investments in LCD (knowledge, processes, and manufacturing) and were reluctant to abandon those completely when TFT LCD emerged. Instead, they attempted to modify their processes and equipment to shift from STN to TFT. By contrast, firms like Fujitsu and IBM did not make significant LCD investments until later in the 1980s, and they optimized their processes specifically for TFT LCD. Hypothesis 2 stated that precommercialization investment in the eventual losing technology would be more advantageous to firms than delaying all knowledge-creation investment until after the resolution of uncertainty between LCD and plasma, as earlier initiation of research in flat panels would increase product value. From Models 1 to 5, it is clear that the coefficient on PRE-1983 PLASMA PATENTS is positive and significant while the coefficient on LATE PATEN-TER is either not significant or only modestly significant (p < 0.10 ). This suggests support for H2. Comparing the coefficients is difficult, as PRE-1983 PLASMA PATENTS is continuous and LATE PATENTER is a dummy. But this suggests that the effect of precommercialization plasma patenting may be different from the effect of delaying investment only at sufficiently high levels of early plasma patenting. Further investigation (by looking at the 95% confidence intervals around the coefficients) shows that the effect of PRE-1983 PLASMA PATENTS becomes significantly larger than the effect of LATE PATENTER (p < 0.05 ) at around 26 pre-1983 plasma patents. This is well within the range of the data and, in fact, approximately 25 percent of firms with their first flat panel patents before 1983 exceed this number (the maximum observed is 86 patents). Thus, H2 is supported with a caveat-only with sufficiently high levels of precommercialization investment. As this effect is meant to capture the learning and resource accumulation effect of early investments in knowledge creation, it seems that early investors that make only small technological investments do not accumulate a sufficient amount of knowledge and assets to build an advantage versus firms that initiated research after uncertainty subsided. In the flat panel display industry, early investors (irrespective of technology) conducted numerous consumer focus groups and user testing projects before 1983 to assess what would drive consumer adoption. That knowledge provided insight into the technical and functional problems that needed to be solved to make flat panels commercially successful, and it transferred easily for firms switching from plasma to LCD since both technologies targeted the same end use markets. Later investors did not have access to this knowledge, and firms with modest early technological investments did not have enough time to refine and hone their offerings based on consumer feedback to benefit from this experience.
The size of these effects is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, note that the dependent variable is effectively a standardized measure of quality (µ∼0, σ ∼1) and the standard deviation of each of the two patenting variables is approximately 1.5. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in pre-1983 plasma patenting increases product value by approximately one-third of a standard deviation. In comparing LCD and plasma, shifting one standard deviation worth of pre-1983 patents from LCD to plasma would produce an increase in product value of nearly 0.75 standard deviations. These interpretations are also supported by additional post hoc analysis (available from the author), using dummy variables to account for technological choices.
These results suggest a rank ordering among the firms in the sample that allows for some speculation about the relative sizes of the effects for H1 (late technological commitment) and H2 (early investment in knowledge creation). Given that late (post-1983) investors in flat panel patenting perform better than early adopters of the winning technology (p < 0.01 ), the benefits of late technological commitment seem to overwhelm the benefits of early investments in knowledge creation in this industry. The fact that hedgers (firms investing in both LCD and plasma) also perform better than early adopters of the winning technology suggests that hedgers, based on their pursuit of both technologies, were also likely to delay significant investments in LCD technology, though not nearly to the extent of switchers. While not conclusive, this rank ordering suggests that the size of the late technological commitment effect (H1) is much larger than that of the early knowledge creation investment effect (H2).
Three controls are statistically significant. First, the measure of pre-entry (but post-uncertainty) experience in the form of LCD patents after 1983 but before firm entry is positive and significant. Firms with greater pre-entry experience in the dominant design produce more valued products subsequently. Second, the coefficient for JAPAN (positive and significant, p < 0.01 ) supports previous research suggesting that Japanese flat panel firms benefitted from sharing more information than companies in other countries (Spencer, 2000) . Third, LCD televisions received significantly lower product value ratings than laptops (the omitted category) and desktops. In terms of the selection bias controls, the control for firm quality (CUMUL EXIT HAZARD) is positive and significant, indicating that firms with the highest exit hazard rate but that produced LCD products appear to be high quality firms and (in turn) produce higher value products. The INVERSE MILLS RATIO control is not significant.
Robustness checks
The results of robustness checks are excluded for the sake of brevity and because they produce no substantive changes in core results, but are briefly discussed.
First, the correlations in Table 2 raised a number of concerns about multicollinearity. One set of concerns centered on the structure of the data where LATE PATENTER firms have zeroes for the early patenting variables. To assess this effect, I have run regressions only on firms with at least one flat panel patent before 1983 and with adding the LATE PATENTER and early patenting variables one at a time. These produce similar results to those reported here. The three other variables with high correlations were LCD PATENTS 1983-to-ENTRY, FIRM SALES, and JAPAN. Excluding either of the first two produces no changes. Excluding JAPAN makes the effect of PRE-1983 LCD PATENTS not significantly different from zero, but it is still significantly smaller than the effect of PRE-1983 PLASMA PATENTS.
Second, I have used dummies that proxy for the technological choices-plasma focus (75% or more of pre-1983 patents in plasma), LCD focus (75% or more of pre-1983 patents in LCD), joint focus (other early patenters), or late patenters. This model supports H1, as the dummy for plasma focus is greater than that for LCD focus, but the dummy for plasma focus is not significantly greater than that for late patenters. This is consistent with the findings reported earlier-early plasma patenting only produces an advantage over late entry when the firm has a large number of pre-1983 plasma patents. This supports the claim that it is the degree of pre-1983 patenting in plasma and LCD that drives the results. More complex categorical models capturing the extent of early investment by technology confirm this conclusion.
Third, I had concerns about Consumer Reports (CR) ratings in terms of how price was handled. CR does not include price in its analysis and, thus, may capture strategic positioning rather than product value. To address this, I used the product's price to predict the CR score for each product. While I do not report the results of the regression here, price is positively related to quality (p < 0.01 ) in the CR ratings, suggesting that they are not price normalized, though the R-squared was very low (less than 15%). 9 I then use the residuals as price-normalized measures of product value and reconstruct the dependent variable. This produces consistent results. I have also included a measure of normalized price (standard deviations above/below the mean by year and category) as a control variable in the analyses, with no change in results.
Fourth, I tested two additional selection bias controls. One uses a selection control similar to the CUM EXIT HAZARD based on the maximum annual hazard faced, as opposed to a cumulative hazard. The other is an additional measure of firm quality based on forward patent citations received. The variable tracks how far above or below the mean (versus patent class and year) the firm's nonflat panel patents have been at generating forward citations (NORMALIZED CITATION RATE, nonflat panel only in Table 1 ), with the idea that this would identify higher quality firms. I dummy out all observations where the firm had no prior patenting. Including these controls does not affect the core results of the model.
Finally, other checks include running a standard random effects model with clustered standard errors, replacing TV/COMPUTER EXPERIENCE with a continuous measure of market share in the relevant product category in 1983, and replacing PRODUCT ENTRY ORDER with a count of years of experience in LCD manufacturing (the number of years since the firm's first panel). These changes produce consistent results with those reported.
DISCUSSION
This article began with a simple suggestion-that the technological choices confronting managers faced with competing technologies of uncertain merit have important long-term implications for firm performance. Prior work on technological competition has focused on which technology wins and why (Arthur, 1989; Schilling, 1998) , while this study investigates the firm-level implications of technological choices. In addition to the feedback-based learning processes by which choices affect behavioral outcomes identified in earlier work (Eggers, 2012) , this study focuses on two new mechanisms by which technological choices affect firm performance-technological commitments (which affect the technological generation the firm supports and the firm's inertia in changing) and pre-entry experience in the broad technological space (which affects the accumulation of knowledge usable across technical generations). The results from the global flat panel display industry show that early investment in the losing technology (plasma) increases subsequent performance in the winning technology (LCD), while early investment in LCD is detrimental to subsequent performance. These surprising results and the theory that explains them have implications both for theory and for managers.
From a research perspective, this study extends the literature on technology transitions (Tripsas, 1997; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) , pre-entry experience (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002) , and technological choices (Tegarden et al., 1999) by highlighting the importance of the messy and uncertain period before the new dominant design actually takes off. Unlike traditional measures of pre-entry experience that focus on experience in a different industry (Klepper and Simons, 2000) or a related market space (Sosa, 2009) , the focus of this study is on the choices that managers make after they choose to pursue the new industry but before the commercialization of the dominant design. And unlike traditional studies of technological transitions, this study doesn't focus only on the move from the old to the dominant new technology, but also on the intervening transitions between emerging technologies and generations. The results show that the exploratory technological choices are an important source of pre-entry heterogeneity that drive long-term performance, even after controlling for classic pre-entry experience and entry timing measures. This precommercialization period has received attention in the shakeout (Agarwal, Sarkar, and Echambadi, 2002; Klepper, 1996) and standard-setting (Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2010; Rysman and Simcoe, 2008) literatures, but little focus has been turned to the specific strategic choices of managers during the period. In this respect, the synthesis of the current study and previous work on failed technological choices (Eggers, 2012 ) offers a series of novel implications for knowledge creation and product outcomes based on these technological choices. Given that technological choices have significant and longlasting implications, future research should focus more attention on how firms develop strategies and make choices during these uncertain and dynamic periods. Specifically in thinking about the two forces this study articulates from the 'window of opportunity' model, future research could investigate whether different types of firms are differentially affected, as some firms may be prone to inertia (large, bureaucratic organizations) and some firms may accumulate greater knowledge through early investments (whether early knowledge is retained or discarded).
Additionally, the results offer implications for managers facing an uncertain new technological space. Importantly, it should be clearly stated that a key finding of this research is not that managers faced with an uncertain technical space should intentionally support the losing technology. This is because the nature of uncertainty makes it no easier to pick the loser than the winner, because mistakes in resource allocation could lead to escalation of commitment to a losing cause (Guler, 2007) or organizational inertia that inhibits adaptation (Eggers, 2012) and because the ability of a firm switching technologies to be successful is highly context dependent (Suarez and Lanzolla, 2007) . But the underlying building blocks for the advantage outlined in this study-the timing of commitment to the winning technology and the ability to transfer useful learning from the losing technology-can provide instructive suggestions for managers dealing with technological uncertainty. First, this study suggests that, in agreement with the technology vintage effect (Bohlmann et al., 2002) , the potential benefits of investing late are tied to the timing of commitment. Firms may be able to make their knowledge-creation investments in an industry early but make their technological commitments later, either through serendipity or by design. The idea that firms may be able to intentionally put off irreversible investments aligns with work on strategic delay options and suggests that such options may be powerful ways for managers to cope with technological uncertainty. More work is needed to understand the specific nature of the relevant timing of decision making and to further investigate how managers can use delay options to their advantage. Second, this study demonstrates the potential advantage that firms may generate by leveraging knowledge (technical or market) developed in one technology when switching to the winning technology. A manager attempting to recover 
